Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1960

F. B. Schick and Mary Even Schick v. J. H. Perry and
Marian Perry : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Clyde & Mecham; Elliott Lee Pratt; Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Schick v. Perry, No. 9246 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3659

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

r:-ILED

F. B. SCHI~K ~nd MARY EVE
: . ~! ~) r· 1- 960"
SCHIC·K, h1s Wife,
J · 1 .,.; '
Plaintiffs an.d A ppe.llam.s,.------ -..... -------------------------------~
Clark,

~p•.;;rea,~euN <J.ltah

-vs.-

9246

J. H. PERRY and MARIAN PERRY,
his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIErEt?strv or: trrA
JUL 1 0 1967

LA.w UBRAQ
CLYDE & MECHAM

BY

Elliott Lee Pratt
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Appellants
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City 11, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................................ 1
STATEMENT OF POINTS...................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT -···········-··········-·········-----------·-···-···-····-········-···············---------·--· 5
POINT 1. - THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARN WAS
PROHIBITED UNDER PARAGRAPH I OF THE
RESTRICTIONS --·-·······-··-·········-········-·····--------------------------·-······-·· 5
A. - THE INTENT OF THE RESTRICTIONS IS TO
PROHIBIT CONSTRUCTION OF STRUCTURES
SUCH AS THE PERRY HORSE BARN OR STABLE.... 5
B.- THE PERRY BARN OR STABLE IS A STRUCTURE WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF P AHAGRAPH I. ···············-··------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8
C. THE ACTIONS OF THE PARTIES AND
OTHERS SUPPORT AN INTERPRETATION OF
THE RESTRICTIONS WHICH PROHIBITS THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARN OR STABLE ______________ 10
POINT II. - THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE RESTRICTIONS CONSIDERED AS A
WHOLE PROHIBITED THE CONSTRUCTION OF
THE HORSE BARN OR STABLE. ---------------------------------------- 11
POINT III. - THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARN WAS
PROHIBITED BY THE BUILDING COMMITTEE. ------ 14
A.- THE BUILDING COMMITTEE IS A VALIDLY
ORGANIZED AND EXISTING COMMITTEE
UNDER THE RESTRICTIONS__________________________________________________ 15
B. - THE DISAPPROVAL OF THE BUILDING
COMMITTEE SHOULD BE DETERMINATIVE OF
THE PERRYS' RIGHT TO CONSTRUCT THE
HORSE BARN. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20
POINT IV. - THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING
ATTORNEYS' FEES TO THE DEFENDANTS.................. 21
SUMMARY -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Granger v. Boulls (Wash.), 152 P. 2d 325, 155 A.L.R. 523................
Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, 211 P. 2d 302 (Cal.), 19 A.L.R.
2d 1268 ·······------.. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Harmon v. Burrow, 106 Atl. 310.... -------------------------··········-----------------------····
In Re: Smithfield City, 70 Utah 564........................................................
Kirkley v. Seipelt, 128 Atl. 2d 430 ....... ---------------------------------------------··-··--McDermott v. American Bonding Company of Baltimore,
179 Pac. 828 (Mont.)···--------------··-----------------------------------------------·········Parrish v. Richards, 8 Utah 2d 419, 336 P. 2d 122·-------------·-·-------···--·-Stanford v. Brooks, 298 S. W. 2d 268.. ·-··---·--·--··------·-----------------·-------------United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Frohmiller,
227 p. 2d 1007________________________________________________________________________________________

12
20
20
16
20
21
8
20
21

ENCYCLOPEDIAS CITED
28 Am.Sponsored
Jur.by the(1959
Vol.) Para. 347.·------------------------··················------------··-- 21
S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
83 C.J .S. 549 --- ----····-······-·····-···-······-···························-···········
--·-······ ............. 8
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUP·REME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
F. B. SCHICK and ~iARY EVE
SCHICK, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No.
9246

-vs.J. H. PERRY and ~1ARIAN PERRY,
his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

AP·PELLANT'S' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF F·ACTS
This is an action brought by plaintiffs (appellants)
to enforce the provisions of certain subdivision restrictions affecting ·Cottonwood Glade Subdivision in Salt
Lake County, Utah. From a Judgment in favor of defendants (respondents), this appeal is taken.
On January 3, 1947, Cottonwood Glade Subdivision,
containing 33 lots, was established by Edward N. Bagley
and his immediate family. (R. 176-178) (Ex. 3-P) On
December 26, 1947, the Bagleys recorded "Restrictions
on ·Cottonwod Glade Subdivision" (Ex. 1-P), which Restrictions were to continue in effect for fifteen years and
contained, among other provisions, the following:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"I. Each and every lot above described shall
be known and is hereby designated as a 'Residential Lot' and no structure shall be erected,
altered, placed or permitted to remain on any such
'Residential Lot' other than one detached singlefamily dwelling not to exceed two stories in height
and a private garage for not more than 3 automobiles.
"V. No noxious or offensive trade or activity shall be carried on upon any residential lot
hereinabove described or any part or portion
thereof, nor shall anything be done thereon "\vhich
may become an annoyance or nuisance to the
occupants of the remaining residential lots hereinbefore described. This district is not intended to
be divided for or used for a commercial area,
therefore, livestock and fowls for this purpose will
not be permitted in the area. (This paragraph is
not intended to restrict the area so as to prohibit
the raising of fine small birds, fowls, or animals
as pets or as a special hobby.) However, the
housing of such pets must be so constructed that
it will not be unsightly and the number of such
birds and pets and the housing for them shall be
approved by the committee."
On January 19, 1951, appellants purchased Lot 11 of
the subdivision (Ex. 8) in reliance upon the Restrictions,
and thereafter construrted a $60,000.00 home on the lot.
(R. 188)
On December 30, 1954, in order to extend the existence of the building co1n1nittee established under Article
III of the Restrictions, an "Agreement Extending Reservations, Restrictions and Covenants" (Ex. 2) was
signed and recorded on December 31, 1954, naming Edward N. Bagley, Harold H. Gloe and Glen C. Peglau as

2
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committee members to act until January 1, 1965. Substantially all of the purchasers of lots from the original
subdividers, including Harold H. Gloe and Olive Gloe,
predecessors in title of the Perrys (respondents), purehased their respective properties subject to the Restrictions. (R. 184, 185) (Ex. 9)
Ever since the origin of the restrictions, the comInittee had been in existence according to the testimony
of respondents' own witnesses. Mr. Bowerbank sought
permission to build fron1 the Building Co1nmittee on July
25, 1955, six months after the agreement to extend the
committee had been executed (Ex. 32). Mr. Peglau,
named as a committee member, signed the July 25 letter
granting said permission (Ex. 32). Mr. Hoggan, defendants' 'vitness, asked for permission of the committee to
build a playhouse (R. 258, 259) and it was granted. Mr.
Clarence Reese, defendants' witness, had acted on the
committee in 1958 (R. 270).
The Perrys acquired Lot 12 from the Gloes on April
9, 1959 (Ex. 5-P), and soon thereafter, on April 24, 1959
(Ex. 6-P), sought permission of the building committee
to construct a three-horse stable and tack room. On May
4, 1959, permission was denied (Ex. 7-P) by the building
committee ( R. 220-221) .
Nevertheless, shortly thereafter the Perrys began
construction on the horse barn, a structure 48 feet long
and about 12 feet wide (R. 222) situate adjacent to appellants' livingroom and patio (R. 190-199) (Exs. 10, 11
and 12). Defendants continued construction until enjoined by a Temporary Injunction issued on June 10,
1959 (R.3).
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The matter came on for trial before Judge A. H.
Ellett (R. 149-171) who ruled in favor of app·ellants
based upon Paragraph I of the Restrictions (R. 163) and
ruled that he would grant appellants' Motion for Judgment on the pleadings unless respondents filed amended
pleadings (R. 170, 171) setting up a defense of estoppel.
The matter was thereafter pretried and finally came
on for non-jury trial before the Honorable Joseph G.
Jeppson on February 2, 1960.
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment were entered February 26, 1960. From a Judgment denying plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial and
Motion to Amend 'Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment (R. 140) and dated March 29, 1960,
this appeal is taken.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
·THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARN WAS PROHIBITED UNDER
PARAGRAPH I OF THE RESTRICTIONS.
A.

THE INTENT OF THE RESTRICTIONS IS TO PROHIBIT ·CONSTRUCTION OF STRUCTURES SUCH AS
THE PERRY HORSE BARN OR STABLE.

B.

THE PERRY BARN OR S'TABLE IS A STRUCTURE
WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF PARAGRAPH I.

C.

THE ACTIONS OF THE PARTIES AND OTHERS
SUPPORT AN INTERPRE'TATION OF THE RESTRICTIONS WHICH PROHIBITS THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARN OR STABLE.

4
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POIN'T II
TilE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
RESTRICTIONS ·CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE PROHIBITED
THE CONS'TRUCTION OF THE HORSE BARN OR STABLE.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
CONSTRUCTION OF 'THE BARN WAS PROHIBITED BY
THE BUILDING COMMITTEE.
A. THE BUILDING COMMITTEE IS A VALIDLY ORGANIZED AND EXISTING COMMITTEE UNDER
·THE RESTRI·CTIONS.
B. THE DISAPPROVAL OF THE BUILDING COMMITTEE SHOULD BE DETERMINATIVE OF THE PERRYS' RIGHT TO CONSTRUCT THE HORSE BARN.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING AITTORNEYS'
FEES TO THE DEFENDANTS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARN WAS PROHIBITED UNDER
PARAGRAPH I OF THE RESTRICTIONS.

A.
THE INTENT OF TI-IE RES'TRICTIONS IS TO PROHIBIT ·CONSTRUCTION OF STRUCTURES SUCH AS
THE PERRY HORSE BARN OR STABLE.

Paragraph I of the Restrictions (Ex 1-P), provides
as follows:
"Each and every lot above described shall be
knovvn and is hereby designated as a residential
lot, and no i s~tructure shall be erected, altered,
placed or permitted to remain in any such residential lot other than one detached single-family
dvvelling not to exceed two stories in height and
a private garage for not more than three automobiles.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is clear that said Paragraph I of the Restrictions,
having a position of prime importance in the paragraphing establishes the tenor of the Restrictions, to-wit, arestricted residential area of fine homes. There are other
provisions which carry out this pattern of an exclusive
neighborhood.
Paragraph III, in part, provides:
"N·o building shall be erected, placed or altered on any building plot in this subdivision
until the building plans, specifications and plot
plat showing the location of such building have
been approved in writing as to conformity and
harmony of external design with existing struc. . ------------------------· ''
. th e subd"IVIslon
t ures In
Paragraph IV p-rovides, in part, as follows:
No building shall be located nearer than 45
feet to the front residential lot line of said Cottonwood Glade Subdivision. . . . No residential
structure shall be erected or placed on any building plot, which plot has an area of less than 20,000
square feet or a width of less than 120 feet at
the front building set back line.''
P·aragraph V provides, in part, as follows:
''No noxious or offensive trade or activity
shall be carried on upon any residential lot hereinbefore described or any part or portion thereof,
nor shall anything be done thereon which may
beco1ne an .annoyance or nuisance to the occupants
of the remaining residential lots hereinbefore described. This district is not intended to be divided
f·or or used for a commercial area, therefore, livestock and fowls for this purpose will not be perInitted in the area. (This paragraph is not intended to restrict the area so as to prohibit the raising

6
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of fine small birds, fowls, or animals as pets or
as a special hobby.) H'O\Vever, the housing of such
pets mu8t be so constructed that it will not be
unsightly and the number of such birds and pets
and the house for them shall be approved by the
committee. ' '
Paragraph VIII provides that:
"No strueture shall be moved onto any residential lot hereinbefore described or any part
thereof unless it meets with the approval of the
committee hereinbefore named, such approval to
be given in writing. ' '
Paragraph XIII provides, in part, that:
''All eovenants and restrictions herein stated
and set forth shall run ... until 15 ye.ars from
the date hereof at which time said covenants and
restrictions shall automatically be extended for
successive periods of 10 years unless by a vote of
the n1ajority of the then owners of said residential
lots, it is agreed to change the said covenants in
whole or in part."
The lots in the Cottonwood Glade Subdivision are
large lots with beautiful, expensive and elaborately landscaped homes situate therein. The Schick house (Ex. 11-P
and 12-P) is typical of the houses which range in value
from $25,000.00 to $50,000.00 (R. 187, 204). The subdivision is just E.ast of Highland Drive along Pheasant
ay and Pheasant Circle and is becoming increasingly
urban along with the rest of Salt Lake County, there now
being only 10 vacant lots in the subdivision ou.t of a total
of 33. (R. 349) (See Ex. 3-P, a plat of the subdivision)

'V

By reason of the vari'Ous restrictions mentioned
above and by reason of the type of residential area being
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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developed under the restrictions, we must conclude that
the subdividers intended Paragraph I to fix the type. of
structures to be allowed within the framework of the restrictions. The first paragraph of the restrictions is absolute, and subsequent paragraphs in the restrictions
conform to :the intent of Paragraph I, but do not and cannot in any way derogate from the intent thereof.
If the Perry horse stable is a structure, then certainly by no reasonable cons~truction or interpretation of
Paragraph I, can it he considered a dwelling or garage.
B
THE PERRY BARN OR STABLE IS A STRUCTURE
WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF PARAGRAPH I.

As defined in Volume 83, C.J.S., at Page 549,
''The word 'structure' usually refers to a
permanent stationary erection and ordinarily
carries with it the idea of size, weight and
strength .... "
Recently this Court, in the case of Parrish v. Richards' 8 u.t. 2d 419, 336 p. 2d 1:22, discussed the interpretation of the word "structure'' in a covenant sin1ilar to
the restrictions here in issue. I quote the applicable portion of the Court's decision:
''The covenant in <raestion uses the general
word 'struetu1·e' ·and then enun1erates garages
and dwellings. This is the class of structure that
is being talked about. That is, it is plainly designed to provide against the building of structures of that kind, sueh as sheds, barns, stores.
The construction given is in accordance 'vith the
language of the eovenant. Garages and other
8
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similar buildings which are of solid construction
are of a different character entirely . . . "
The covenant in question in the Parrish case provided as follows:
''Use of land: Each lot is hereby design ated
as a residential lot and none of the said lots shall
be improved, used or occupied for other than private single family residence purposes, and no flat
or apartment house ... shall be erected ... other
than a one, two or three car garage, and one single
family dwelling, not to exceed one story in height.
1

"
The Cou:flt, in determining what was included under
the term ''structure'' used the principle ''ejusdem generis,'' st,ating in effect that where the term "structure''
is used follovved by the enumer.ation of the type of dwelling to be allo,ved, that the word "structure'' refers to
that similar type of structure and prohibits the construction of such similar types of structures as sheds, barns
and stores. The use of the word ''structure'' followed by
a particular enumeration of the types of dwellings to be
allowed should give the s:ame interpretation to our own
restrictions as was given to the restrictions in the Parrish
case. In other words, a barn or stable such as the one
construcrted by the Perrys would fall in the class of structures prohibited under Paragraph I.
·Certainly there can be no question that the contemplated barn or stable is a structure. The views from the
Schick livingroom window (Ex. 11-P) and from the
Schick patio area (Ex. 12-P) show a very substantial and
permanent cinder block structure. The building had footSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ings !and foundations (R. 324), consisted of three s.talls
of 12 feet in width each, a hay storage area, and had an
overall length of 48 feet (R. 221). The building is 12 feet
wide and will be approximately 8% feet high and covered
wirth brick (R. 222.)
The barn or stable is constructed at the rear of the
Perry's lot and is separate from the Perry's house by a
horse exercise ring having an approximate diameter of
100 feet and being built up above ground level about 6
inches (R. 327-330). The barn or stable is almost adjacent the Schicks' back yard patio area and the exercise
ring would, -of course, be almost opp'Osite the livingroom
area of the Schi·ck home (R. 192-194) (Ex. 10-P).

to

It is difficult to imagine any structure which more
cle.arly viol;ates the intent to maintain an exclusive and
beautiful residential area than does this large barn with
its •attendant horse exercis·e ring and other facilities. It
is likewise difficult to conceive of a structure more objectionable in its use and in its location with reference to
the Schick home than is this horse harn or stable. As a
corollary to the above statements, there can be a no more
reasonable interpretati'On of the restrictions than an interpretation e:x:cluding the construction of a substantial
and permanent horse barn in such a restricted residential
are'a.

c
THE ACTIONS OF THE PARTIES AND OTHERS
SUPPORT AN INTERPRE'TATION OF THE RESTRICTIONS WHICH PROHIBITS THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARN OR STABLE.

10
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Although defendant Perrys now raise a doubt as to
the interpretation of P·aragraph I, there seemed to have
been no doubt in their minds at the time they C'Ommenced
construction of the barn. The Perrys wrote a letter to the
building committee (Ex. 6-P), in which permission w.as
requested to build this stable. This permission, of course,
was denied by the building committee by a letter (Ex.
7-P) signed by Edward Bagley.
1

Through·out the evidence, the Perrys attempted to
show sheds and barns constructed here and there
throughout :the subdivision. Actually there is no comparison between the permanent Perry barn and these
other one or two temporary buildings or sheds. Furthermore, subdivision owners constructing these small sheds
recognized the prohibition against constructing any
building on the l~ots without the approval of the building
committee, by first obtaining approval of the committee.
1

Mr. Bowerbank likewise recognized the prohibition
against structures by ,asking permission to construct a
shelter or shed on his property (Ex. 32-D). Mr. John F.
Hogan also recognized the prohibition against certain
structures by asking permission to move onto his property a eertain small childrens' playhouse (R. 258, 259).
All of these people were witnesses called by the Perrys.
POINIT II
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
RESTRICTIONS ·CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE PROHIBITED
THE CONS'TRUCTION OF THE HORSE BARN OR STABLE.

The Court concluded in Paragraph II of the Conclusions of Law (R. 132) that the restrictions permitted
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the erection of housing sufficient to accommodate the
Perrys' three horses. This conclusion is bras.ed upon the
provisions of Paragraph V of the restrictions. Said conclusion, however, is in error for the f·ollowing reasons:
1. Paragraph V of the restrictions describes and
limits the activities which can be performed in the residential subdivision. Its primary purpose has to do with
activity and usage of the land rather than wi·th the type
of structure allowed thereon. Paragraph I, however,
establishes the type of structure to be allowed. As h~as
been indicated in the ease of Granger v. Boulls (Wash.)
152 P. 2d 325, 155 A.L.R. 523, the specific type of structure provided for cannot be changed or modified by a
subsequent provision in the restrictions rel~ating to the
use of the prop·erty. The Court says:
1

"Undoubtedly the covenants in the instant
case were for the purpose of segregating the l~and
into a private residential district. That it failed to
restrict the use of the land itself for farming is
clear, but it is equally cle,ar that it did p~rohibit
the use of farm buildings as distinguished from
private dwellings.''
In this law suit, we .are eoncerned \vith the type of
structure which has been con1menced by the Perrys and
we are seeking to enjoin the construction of a barn or
stable and not the use of the yard for n1aintenance of
the Perrys' three horses. Therefore,, of prime concern in
the interpret-ation of these restrictions is the type of
structure allowed under P'aragr;aph I. That type of structure cannot be extended to include structures, such as
pennanent horse s~tables, which might conceivably be
necessary or incident to ;the use of th.e residentirallot for

12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the eare of horses. Paragraph I is an absolute prohibition against the construction of the barn. Any housing \vhich 1nay be allowed in connecti'On with the activity
to be conducted on the prop.erty, must be within the intent of Paragraph I of the restrictions . Although Paragraph V permits housing, if ap·proved by the committee,
the committee is not given the permissi'On to go beyond
the provisions of Paragra.p·h I in the approval of any
housing. The committee certainly cannot approve a
structure which is prohibited under Paragraph I.
2. What effect should he given to the phrase 1n
Paragraph V, "fine small birds, fowls, or animals as pets
or as a special hobby"~ The Court has in its Findings,
determined that the Perrys' horses ·are pets within this
provision (R. 131, Par. 6), and, therefore, housing for
these animals is allowed. Appellants cannot ·agree with
such ~an interpretation which places horses within the
category of "fine small birds, fowls, or animals." Certainly a horse is not a fine small animal, there being no
larger animal which might conceivably be kept on these
subdivision lots. If we were to believe that a horse did fit
in an .animal category under said phrase, then we would
htave to limit the applieability of the words, "fine small"
to the "\Viord "birds" only. It is, of course, absurd to so
di,stinguish between small and large birds without at the
same time distinguishing between small and large fowls
and small and large animals. Thus ''fine sm:a.Il'' must
refer not only to birds, but also to fowls and animals.
This interpretation is, of course, consistent with the purpose and intent of maint·aining fine residential homes in
the subdivision. Therefore, we 0an only conclude that if
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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there is any exclusion from the usages prohibited under
P·ar.agraph V, the raising of horses is not so excluded.
The housing for h·orses regardless of its typ·e is not permitted under these restrictions and it matters not what
the status of the committee might be.
3. In bringing the construction of the horse stable
under the exclusionary language of Paragraph V, the
court has held that the horses kept by the Perrys are pets
and that no part of the use of the horses is intended to be
commercial. (R. 131, Par. 6) (R. 141, Par. 2(b)) The
evidence clearly shows that the Perrys were not keeping the horses ias pets, but were engaged in an extensive
horse raising and horse sho\ving endeavor. (R. 223)
They bought and sold horses each year and actually had
pu:vchased 15 brood mares in November of 1959 in order
to :vaise horses for sale on their Nevada ranch. (R. 224)
The Perrys travel extensively to most of the Western
states for the various horse sho,vs and very often sell
their horses after a successful showing. (R. 225, 226)
This type of program, including extensive showing,
buying and selling and traveling with the horses, and
further including a p·ermanent horse stable and large
exercise ring, hardly seems compatible with the theory
of keeping of horses as pets. Such evidence cannot support the Court's finding of fact (R. 131), th~at these
horses are pets or are not used in a commercial endeavor,
notwithstanding Mr. Perry's repe~ated claims that this
was just a hobhy. If it conreiv.ably "'"as a hobby, it seems
to have been a profitable one to s:ay the least.
1

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE

14
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CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARN WAS PROHIBITED BY
THE BUILDING COMMITTEE.

Notwithstanding the unequivocal provisions of Paragraph I of the Restrictions, and notwithstanding the
other provisions of the Restrictions discussed above, and
assuming the Court finds it necessary to look even further into the existence 'and powers enjoyed by the building committee, the authority of the committee and the
provisions of the Re,strictions as well as the activities of
the committee should be examined, particularly in view
of the fact th·at the committee refused to approve the
construction of the Perrys' barn. (Exs. 6-P and 7-P) (R.
220,221)
A
THE BUILDING COMMITTEE IS A VALIDLY OR..
GANIZED AND EXISTING COMMITTEE UNDER
·THE RESTRI·CTIONS.

Paragraph III provides for the approval by a committee of the plans, specifications and plot plans for any
building erected, placed or altered in the subdivision.
Paragraph III further provides that the approval of the
committee was not required .after January 1, 1955, unle8s
an instrument ''executed by the then record owners of a
majority of the lots in the subdivision" (Ex. 1-P) was
duly executed ·and recorded prior to January 1, 1955 (Ex.
2-P).
Paragraph III does require th·at the record owners
of a majority of the 32 lots (Lots 1-27 and 29-33) (Ex.
3-P) execute this extension agreement in order to extend
the authority of the committee past January 1, 1955. Exhibit 3-P, the plat of the subdivision, shows the record
1
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owners as of December 30, 1954 and Exhibit 2-P, the extension agreement, shows the number ·of signatures of
the record owners of 17 lots. of the subdivision. These lots
are Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32
and 33. Thus a majority of the lots are represented by
signatures of the record owners. H'Owever, the ·Court
found (P.ar. 2, R. 130) that a majority of the lot owners
h!ad not signe·d said .agreement, apparently on the reasoning th~at only Harold H. GlO'e signed for !tot 12 and only
.Ar.thur Pratt signed for lot 8. The wives of the latter two
owners did not sign.
Appellants contend that the Court erred in making
such a finding .and further contend that the committee
was duly constituted and extended, upon the follo\\ring
grounds:
1. The p·eople who signed the extension agreement
recorded it December 31, 1954, apparently believing and
intending that the extension agreement had been properly
executed and that it hrud the necessary signatures, including the sign,atures for lots 8 and 12.
2. Even though the wives of Harold Gloe and
Arthur Pratt did not sign the extension agreement, such
a defect, if it be .one, is not of sufficient importance to
nullify the effect of this agreen1ent and to render it void.
After all, this extension agreement is not a conveyance
of property and thus the technicality of conveyancing
need not be followed. Our Supreme Court, in the ca.se of
In Re: Smithfield City, 70 Utah 564, in discussing the
neees~ity of legal and technical eo1nplianee 'vith ownership lav\T in the signing of a petition, held that the o'vner-
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ship conte1nplated was the equitable and P'OSsessory ownership rather than the technical leg.al title. The Court
~aid:

"In every case where construction is necessary t~o determine the sense in which the word is
used, the object sought to be reached in the statute
is the most i1nportant consideration. . . . Many
authorities to the same general effect .are cited in
the annotated case reported in 2 A.L.R.. , pages
778 to 804, and while not entirely agreed, we think
that the weight of authority and the better reasoning defines the word 'ownership' as used in
statutes similar to the one here involved as proprietorship in or dominion over the propeTty,
rather than mere legal title without either proprietorship or dominion.
"Titles are not determined, nor are they in
any wise affected by proceedings such as this one.
Choice of the form ·of local government alone is
.
lved .... "
1nvo
Therefore, it can hardly be said in this case that the
signature of either Mrs. Pratt or Mrs. Gloe was necessary to validate this extension agreement, \vhen all persons concerned accepted the agreement as having been
executed and by their actions approved and ratified the
agreement.
3. M-r. H.arold Gloe, who did sign and who was appointed to and acted on the building committee (Ex. 2-P),
was the predecessor in title of the Perrys and sold lot 12
to the Perrys April 9, 1959. (Ex. 5-P) Certainly it is reasonable to hold the Perrys to the same restriction t:o
which their predecessor Gloe was held. Paragraph XIII
of the restrictions so provides. The Perrys are the first
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people in the subdivision to atte·mpt to disavow the existence of the building committee.
4. From the evidence, it appears that all concerned,
including the Perrys, recognized the existence of the
committee from January 1, 1955 on to the pres.ent time:
(a) First and foremost, the Perrys themselves
·considered the committee of good standing. They believed it was necessary to obtain the committee's
app-roval for the construction of their barn and only
after having the committee refuse to approve the
barn, did the Perrys apparently decide to ignore the
committee and proceed without the necessary approval. (Ex. 6-P and 7-P)
(b) Mr. William Bo\verbank \Yas called by the
Perrys as perhap.s their chief witness and he testified
at length concerning his dealings with the new committee as it had been reractivated after January 1,
1955 (R. 234, 235). Particularly, Mr. Bowerbank testified regarding his application to the committee and
to MT. Glen Peglau (Ex. 32-D), wherein Mr. Bowerbank sought ~approval of the ~construction of a shed
and of a circular tank. This request was made
July 25, 1955 after the co1n1nittee had been reactivated by the extension agreement. It should be
noted that the application of Mr. Bowerb~ank was
supposedly approved by 1\tir. Peglau, acting as one
of the con1mittee mernbers. It should also be noted
that Mr. Bovverbank ""'as one of the lot owners shown
on Exhibit 3-P as of Decen1ber 30, 1954, and " . e must
assun1e b~r his actions and testimony that he ratified
the execution of the agreernent by reason of his

18
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recognition of the com1nittee in July of 1955.
(c) Mr. Glen C. PHglau, another of the Perrys'
witnesses who was named on the extension agreemHnt as a committee member, (R. 286) testified thaJt
he was an active member of the building committee
subsequent to January 1, 1955.
(d) Clarence W. Ree.se, still another of the
Perrys' witnesses, and the owner of lot 4 of 'the subdivision, as shown on Exhibit 3-P, also testified that
he had been elected a member of the building committee in 1958 (R. 270). Thus WH have still another
record owner who r'atified the execution of the extension agreement.
(e) Mr. John T. Hogan, still another witness
of the Perrys and also a lot owner in the subdivision
testified that he had obtained in 1955 approval of the
committee for the construction of a small childrens'
playhouse at the re'ar of his p·roperty (R. 259).
All of the foregoing evidence and the admissions of
the Perrys clearly indicate that the people in the subdivision recognized thaJt the building committee had been continued past January 1, 1955 and further shows th'at
everyone relied upon the existence of the committee ij~
seeking approval of various plans and specifications for
different types of small sheds and buildings to be placed
upon their respective properties. There is no evidence to
the contrary and there surely is no evidence to indicate
that the committee had not been properly extended, except the absence of the signaJtures of the two wives which
are mentioned above.
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Therefore, the court should have found that the committee's existence was extended past January 1955 and
th~at it was a duly constituted .and effective eommittee at
the time the Perrys sought approval for the horse barn.
B.
THE DISAPPROVAL OF THE BUILDING COMMITTEE SHOULD BE DETERMINATIVE OF THE PERRY'S RIGHT TO CONSTRUCT THE HORSE BARN.

If v1e assume, as we are in this argument under this
particular p·oint that the approval of the eommi,ttee is the
only basis for prohibiting the construction of the barn,
then having determined that the committee was a valid
commi,ttee, it follows by reason of the restrictions that
the disapprov.al of the eommittee would prevent the Perrys from constructing the barn. See Harmon v. Burow,
106 At. 310; Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, 211 P. 2d 302,
('Calif.) 19 A.L.R. 2.d 1268; Kirkley v. Seipelt, 128 At. 2d
430, and Stanford v. Brooks, 298 S.W. 2d 268.
The approval, however, required of the committee
c.annot and should no1t transcend the requirements set
forth in Paragraph 1 of the restrictions. In other words,
the appr·oval referred to still must apply to structures
within the scope of Paragraph I. Absent any such approval, Paragraph I 1nust still be given the in1port \Yhich
follo\vs fro1n jts position as the para1nount covenant in
these restrictions. The approval \Yithin the com1nittee's
authority relates to the housing for pets and said housing must still come \vi thin the restrictions of Paragraph I.
There can he no question but that the construction of
a barn and the use of the barn \vould be detrin1en~tal to
the Schick~ in this ·ca.se and there ran be no question but
th~at the disapproval of the conunittee \v.as reasonable.
20
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POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING A'TTORNEYS'
FEES TO THE DEFENDANTS.

Injunction cases such as the subject one are one of the
few clas.ses of li tigation in which attorneys' fees are allowed as da1nages. In this type of case, there is a very
narrow rule which h'a.s been quite uniformly established
by our courts to the effect that where attorneys' fees are
all·owed as damages, they can only be fees incurred for
services rendered in obtaining the disolution of the injunction. In 28 Am. Jttr., Par. 347 (1959 Vol.) the rule is
stated thusly:
1

"Under this view it is incumbent on the party
claiming damages to show either that the injunCtion was the sole relief to which the suit pertained
or that the fees and expenses were paid out solely
for the purpose of securing the dissolution uf the
injunction as distinguished from expenditures
for the hearing of the principle issues in the
case.'' (numerous cases cited in support thereof)
See also McDe.rmott v. Amerkan Bonding Company of
Baltimore, 179 P. 828 (Montana) and United Sta.tes Fidelity and Guaranty Co1npany v. Frohmiller, 227 P. 2d
1007.
The testimony of Mr. Richards, one of the attorneys
for the defendants, indicates ~as a basis for the attorneys'
fee charged, the expenditures of 92 hours outside of court
and 7 days in court on v.arious Motions, Pre-trials and
trials. (R. 343, 344) However, many of these hours and
several days in court were expended in connection with
a third-party aCJtion brought by the defendants against
Harold and Olive Gloe, which ruction was ultimately disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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missed. The various pleadings indicate that there must
have been a substantial number of hours and days expended which did not rel·ate to the dissolution of the injun0tion. The defendants' third-party claim appears at
page 38 of the Record; defendants' Motion and Notice
relating thereto ap·pear at page 43, 47 of the Record; the
third-party Motion to Dismiss appears at page 77 of the
Record, the defendants' Notice of Deposition of the thirdparty defendants app·ears at page 86 of the Record; a
further Pre-Trial at which the Third-Party Complaint
was argue.d appe.ars at page 88 and further argument in
connection with the third-party defendants appears at
pages 94 and 95 of the Record.
No where is there any evidence by the defendants nor
is there any finding by this court showing what part of
the leg.al services relruted entirely to the dissolution of the
injunction. ·The evidence indicates a flat total number of
hours and a total number of days covering all matters relating to the litigation. This failure to segregate the a~
torneys' fees is f.atal to the defendants' recovery of said
fees as da1nages and the court's Findings and Conclusions
in this respect are in error.
SUMMARY
The ·Schicks purchased their lolt in 1949 and thereafter built a $60,000.00 house in the very exclusive Cottonwood Glade Subdivision in reliance upon the sanctity
of the restrictive covenants. After several ye.ars, considerable effort and a substantial invest1nent, the Schicks
now have a very beautifully landscaped hon1e, as do many
others in Cotton"\Yood Glade Subdivision. By reason of
the construction of the horse barn or stable just across
22
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the property line from their patio and living area, the
Sehicks are now faced with the degrading prospects of
forever looking out of their large glass walled livingroom
and from their patio into the Perrys' large horse barn
with all of its attendant unpleasantries. This surely is
not the type of protection contemplated under these restrictions and particularly under Paragraph I thereof.
Judge Elletlt, at the first trial of this matter, very
clearly held that Paragraph I prohibited the construction
of the barn (R. 162, 163, 166, 167 and 169), but at the
same time indicated that there might be a factual issue
relaJting to estoppel. The defendants were then allowed
to amend their pleadings so as to raise this defense and
the trial "\Vas set over for this re.ason. The second trial
was had and Judge Jep·pson ruled that there was no estoppel (R. 108) but at the same time found contrary ~o
Judge Ellett's ruling, that the restrictions did not p·rohibit the construction of the h·orse b.arn. The defendants,
therefore, were given two opportunities for an interpretation of the restrictions to be given in their favor. The
first interpretation by Judge Ellett would seem to be the
correct one.
If non-conforming structures such as this horse barn
are permitted under the guise of ''housing for animals,''
then Paragraph I of the restrictions has absolutely no
purpose. It is axiomatic that docun1ents, inc] uding restrictive covenants, are construed by giving proper
weight to the various portions thereof and it is only colnmon sense to reason thaJt Paragraph I was placed in these
restrictions for the purp·ose of establishing the type of
structures to be allowed on these subdivision lots.
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Going beyond Paragraph I and into the other provisions of the restrictions, it is difficult to understand why
the committee can he so completely byp~assed as it has
be·en by the trial court. If nothing else, the committee,
by its letter to 'the Perrys (Ex. 7 and 8) represented a
current 'eonstruction and interpretation of th·e effect of
Paragraph I. This letter signed by J\{r. Bagley, certainly
represents the thinking of lthe man who originally subdivided the ground and who originally filed the restrietions. He said :
"Under the building restrictions coveTing the
Cottonwood Glade Subdivision, the housing of
horses is nolt allowed and the buildng com1nittee
has no power to authorize the construction of
barns as requested in y'our letter of April 24th."
Whether based upon Paragraph I alone, or upon all
of the covenants, or upon the functions and powers of the
committee, it seems inescapable that a large permanent
horse barn or stable has no place in this exclusive residential subdivision and that its construction is a violation
of the subdivision restrictions.
WHEREFORE, appellants respectfully pray tha:t
this Honorable Court reverse the decision of the trial
court and make permanent the temporary injunction
heretofore issued.
Re-spectfully submitted,
CLYDE & MECHAM

BY
Elliott Lee Pratt
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Appellants
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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